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Abstract 
Historical accounts of private violence in international relations are often rather under-
theorised and under-contextualised. Overall, private violence historically needs to be seen in 
the context of the relationship between state-building, political economy and violence, rather 
than through the narrative of states gradually monopolising violence. Pirates and privateers in 
late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century Europe were embedded in a broader political 
economy of violence which needed and actively promoted ‘private’ violence in a broader 
pursuit of power. As such, the de-legitimatisation of piracy and privateering were the 
consequence of a number of interlinked political economic trends, such as the development of 
public protection of merchant shipping (through the growth of centralised navies), the move 
away from trade monopolies to inter-imperial trade, and the development of capitalism and 
industrialism. Present forms of private violence also need to be seen as part of a broader 
historical dynamic of war, violence and political economy. 
 
Historical accounts of private violence in international relations are often rather under-
theorised and under-contextualised. A re-examination of the era of European state-building in 
terms of the relationship between states and private forms of violence can produce important 
insights about the role and context of private violence in history. Overall, private violence 
should be seen in the context of the broader relationship between state-building, political 
economy and violence, rather than through the narrative of states gradually monopolising 
violence. Otherwise it is all too easy to overdraw lessons from the past. Early modern forms 
of private violence were linked especially to two factors: the mercantilist global economy and 
the process of state-building. As processes of state-building, war making, and the pursuit of 
commerce continued, the eventual consolidation of strong states in Western Europe, with 
                                                
1 Thanks to Alex Colas, Douglas Bulloch, Benjamin de Carvalho and Halvard Leira and the three 
anonymous referees for their comments on the original paper, which greatly influenced its current form.   
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clear distinctions between state and private violence (in naval terms, seen in the development 
of strong, centralised navies, especially exemplified by Britain), went hand-in-hand with the 
de-legitimation of private violence. 
While state-building in the West certainly reached a new peak in the late-nineteenth to 
mid-twentieth century, state-building processes in the developing world continue, though 
down different historical trajectories given by the legacy of imperialism and colonialism. 
That the concern with private violence in the developing world is so great is therefore no 
surprise, and also feeds into problems with wars based on predation.2 However, the 
development of a highly integrated global capitalist economy, with a leading ideology of 
economic liberalism should give some caution when making comparative claims. Present 
forms of private violence found in private military companies (PMCs) and piracy are part of a 
broader historical dynamic of war, violence and political economy. The forms of private 
violence in existence today need to be seen in the context of the present global economic 
system.  
A key example is the relationship between privateering and piracy in late-seventeenth and 
early-eighteenth century Europe, which in hindsight contained a similar ‘blurring’ between 
public and private as that of current private violence. While piratical activity was always 
proscribed, the differences between the two were often more blurred in practice, as raiding 
and treasure seeking formed a continuum of activity, and the circulation of mariners between 
merchantmen, legitimate state-sanctioned naval vessels and pirate crews further created 
conceptual problems in distinguishing between actors. However, only reflecting on these 
blurred distinctions can cause more problems than it solves. An overemphasis on the legal 
status of actors (symptomatic of much of the literature on private violence) has especially 
contributed to a number of flawed understandings of the historical practices of private 
violence. While understanding the legitimacy of such actors in international relations is 
                                                
2 E.g. Paul Collier, ‘Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective’, in Greed & Grievance: Economic 
Agendas in Civil Wars, ed. Mats Berdal (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), and M. L. Ross, ‘Oil, Drugs, and 
Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil War’, in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: 
Beyond Greed and Grievance, eds. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003). 
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important, broader contextual issues can actually demonstrate why such actors exist, and how 
distinctions work in this context. 
The main argument of what follows is that piracy and privateering in the late-seventeenth 
and early-eighteenth century flourished due to the political-economic usefulness of the actors. 
Pirates and privateers were embedded in a broader political economy of violence which 
needed and actively promoted ‘private’ violence in a broader pursuit of power, both by newly 
forming states that relied on naval power, and by economic actors who relied on violence as a 
form of protection. In the emerging European naval powers in the seventeenth century, these 
two aspects went hand in hand, as forms of a mercantilist driven state-building. As such, the 
de-legitimatisation of piracy and privateering are the consequence of a number of interlinked 
political-economic trends, such as the development of public protection of merchant shipping 
(through the growth of centralised navies), the move away from trade monopolies to inter-
imperial trade, and, crucially, the gradual development of capitalism and industrialism. 
The embedding of piracy and privateering in a logic of state-building manifested by a 
mercantilist global economy where plunder and predation were part of the logic of war, but 
also part of the logic of commerce, does much to explain their existence. The analysis will 
develop in three stages. First, a critique of Janice Thomson’s work on the decline of private 
violence will help to better understand the context of seaborne private violence in late-
seventeenth century Europe. Second, this critique will be expanded to examine mercantilism 
as an economic system, and how this impacted on the strategy of actors. Third, more detail 
about the specific role of seapower in the period of roughly 1650-1750, particularly 
emphasising the different approaches of England and France, will show the importance of 
raiding and plunder to political and economic power. While the analysis is specific to 
seapower in the early modern period, the analysis will provide a bridge to studying seaborne 
predation and other forms of private violence in the contemporary period, and some 
suggestions to that end will be made in the conclusion. 
 4 
Pirates and Privateers as Private Violence 
There has recently been a rise in many forms of private violence, from the use of private 
military companies (PMCs) which have precedents in mercenaries of the past, to a resurgence 
of piracy, especially in regions where there is some lawlessness in the open seas. Such trends 
are exemplified by the enormous scale of the use of private military and security firms in 
Iraq, as well as the continuing impact of such firms in sub-Saharan Africa. 3 Additionally, and 
importantly in the context of the argument that follows, there has been an increasing 
prevalence of piracy, seen in a number of recent high-profile pirate attacks, exemplified by 
the October 2008 hijacking of an oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden.4 The recent resurgence of 
private violence should be seen as somewhat of a surprise, as it is generally argued that forms 
of private violence had been all but wiped out through the course of the nineteenth century, 
and certainly by the early-twentieth, as national states developed monopolies over legitimate 
violence. With the gradual re-legitimation of private violence in the present, seen in the real 
overlap between private and public in contemporary military actions, there is a need to re-
examine the varieties of private violence prevalent in the early-modern period of European 
state building, in order to provide greater analytic clarity into current happenings.5  
Much of the contemporary debate about the use of private military actors has been 
focused on their legitimacy and effectiveness compared to national armed forces. In the 
context of the historical de-legitimation of private violence the focus on legitimacy is not 
surprising, considering that it comes as part of a discussion about the ‘outsourcing’ of state 
security, and has resonance with analyses of state-building. In this context, private, privatised 
and ‘non-state’ violence are often used interchangeably: I use ‘private’ violence in order to 
highlight the contingency of the national-state monopolisation of the means of violence, and 
                                                
3 Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) and  P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).  
4 William Langewiesche, The Outlaw Sea: A World of Freedom, Chaos, and Crime (New York: North 
Point Press, 2004); Roger Middelton, ‘Piracy in Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding Local Wars’, 
Chatham House Briefing Paper (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2008); and Martin M. 
Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International Security, Adelphi Paper 
388 (London: Routledge, 2008). 
5 Puchala provides one interesting take on this, examining historical piracy, and especially the war on 
piracy, to make contemporary comparisons with the ‘war on terror’: Donald J. Puchala, ‘Of Pirates and 
Terrorists: What Experience and History Teach’, Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 26, No. 1 (2005): 1-24. 
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also distinguish from ‘privatised’ violence, which refers to a process whereby ‘public’ 
violence is made private.6 A focus on private violence allows a clearer analysis of both past 
and present forms of violence, as well as their relation to states.  
Janice Thomson’s Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns7 was a landmark work in the use 
of historical sociology to understand change in a key feature of international relations: the 
relationship between the means of violence and the sovereign national-state.8 A key 
contribution which Thomson made was the development of analytic categories to describe the 
variety of relationships between the state and violence. Thomson’s analytic framework relies 
on a threefold distinction, between decision-making authority, allocation, and ownership, 
where all three distinctions can be categorised in terms of state or private. Decision-making 
authority only concerns who makes decisions about the use of force, the state or private 
actors. Allocation has to do with whether or not the violence is allocated by the market or 
authoritatively. Finally, ownership concerns which actors actually ‘own’ the specific means 
of violence, including labour and capital.  
While Thomson’s distinctions are a useful starting point to understanding private 
violence, they contain a number of problems, mainly to do with anachronistic use of 
concepts. The main problem with these categories is that they are state-centric, in a very 
profound way: though the early-modern period she discusses certainly involves the complex 
processes leading to the rise of national states in Europe,9 it is anachronistic to analyse them 
in terms of their legitimate authority, which was only partial, and in terms of state versus 
nonstate, as if it was easy to distinguish between these two realms in that period.  
Many of the key problems are compounded by an overriding focus on legitimacy and 
legality, often implied by the distinction between public and private. For example, prior to the 
                                                
6 Thanks to Benjamin de Carvalho and Halvard Leira for these distinctions. Owens has further discussed the 
conceptual problems surrounding ‘private’ and ‘public’ in the case of current issues about the privatisation of 
violence. Patricia Owens, ‘Distinctions, Distinctions: “Public” and “Private” Force?’, International Affairs Vol. 
84, No. 5 (2008): 977-90. 
7 Janice Thompson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in 
Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
8 Following Tilly, ‘national state’ is used to refer to the generic form of state developing in Europe, whereas 
‘nation-state’ is more specific to states with homogenous nationalities within them (or the consequence of a 
nationalising process): Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 900-1990 (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992). 
9 Tilly, Coercion; c.f. Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1979). 
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solidification of European states, seaborne protection was mainly in the hands of merchants 
who needed to protect their cargos, and armed merchantmen were the main force on the 
seas:10 this arrangement was certainly legitimate, but understanding the relationship is highly 
limited by just focusing on that aspect. The problem of legitimacy during the early modern 
period was more precisely due to the relationship between violence and state-building, and 
the overall exercise in authority state-building was meant to be. Until states had practically 
outlawed the legitimacy of private violence, merchants that required protection on the seas 
would acquire it however they could. Tilly’s description of war-making and state-making as 
organised crime are very salient in this context. As Tilly notes, ‘a tendency to monopolize the 
means of violence makes a government’s claim to provide protection, in either the comforting 
or ominous sense of the word, more credible and more difficult to resist.’11 The concentration 
and monopolisation of violence by national states sat in tension with the existence of other 
sources of violence and protection. As such, legitimacy would always be an issue until 
national-states were fully consolidated.  
Thomson further notes that such issues were bound up with the problematic nature of the 
high sea as a legal jurisdiction, which was not resolved until the end of the nineteenth 
century. In fact, the issue of legality (and tied into legitimacy) at sea was even more 
contentious than this: as Benton notes, in the early modern period maritime violence, 
particularly the actions of pirates and privateers, was instrumental in helping to define and 
shape the law of the seas.12 As she concludes, ‘if oceans were in some sense quintessentially 
“global”, it was not because they were assumed to be empty, vast and lawless but because 
globally circulating processes were transforming them into a different kind of bounded legal 
space.’13 
However, in general, the focus on legitimacy is problematic. Though it is important to 
analyse the legal and legitimate status of both privateers and pirates as forms of private 
                                                
10 Jan Glete, Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650: Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe (London: 
UCL Press, 1999), chap. 1. 
11 Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in Bringing the State Back In, eds. 
P.B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 172. 
12 Lauren Benton, ‘Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the Origins of Ocean Regionalism’, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History Vol. 47 (2005): 706-721. 
13 Benton, ‘Legal Spaces’, 724. 
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violence across the early modern period, it masks many complexities of historical context: in 
particular, that as European states developed, and the Atlantic economy with it, seaborne 
violence took on new roles that are not easily comparable in terms of legitimacy and law. 
Most historical reflection on private violence has amounted to looking at how states 
eventually monopolised legitimate violence within (and without) their territories, thus 
focusing specifically on the historical process of monopolisation and legitimation. While this 
historical focus serves well to point to the contingent nature of the national-state monopoly 
on violence,14 it leaves the only current work to do in terms of categorising forms of private 
violence in terms of their relation to states. Why does this matter? By rectifying these aspects 
of Thomson’s argument, we can add in a more thoroughly historicised understanding of 
private violence that will better account for the dynamics of the reclaiming of violence by 
private actors. Better understanding both the early modern economic factors and the 
complicated issue of legitimacy will help to better illuminate the environment that allowed 
for private violence to exist in the first place.  
Beyond the issue of legitimacy, the key problem in Thomson’s account is the articulation 
of ‘public’ and ‘private’, which impacts on both the consideration of what markets were in 
the mercantilist period, but also the relationship between state and economy more generally. 
Thomson’s lack of recognition of the historical specificity of the mercantilist political 
economy makes the discussion of ostensibly ‘private’ forms of violence exceedingly difficult. 
The distinction between state and market which Thomson makes was highly problematic in 
the early modern period. The modern conception of a functionally differentiated ‘private’ 
sphere could not be said to exist in the early-modern period of state formation. As a number 
of writers have observed,15 the separation of state and economy, and consequently public and 
                                                
14 Works such as Thomson’s dramatically overstate the importance of a monopoly of violence in the 
definition of the state, and unsurprisingly neo-Weberians such as Mann have importantly excluded the 
monopolisation of legitimate violence from their definitions of the state; e.g. Michael Mann, Sources of Social 
Power, Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Furthermore, the focus on monopolisation 
misses other forms of the transnational constitution and organisation of force, through imperial power, through 
client-states and forms of internationalisation. For an analysis along these lines, see Tarak Barkawi, 
Globalization and War (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). 
15 Ellen Meiksins Wood, ‘The Separation of the “Economic” and the “Political” in Capitalism’, in 
Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995); Benno Teschke, ‘Theorizing the Westphalian System of State: International Relations from Absolutism 
to Capitalism’, European Journal of International Relations Vol. 8, No. 1 (2002): 5-48; Justin Rosenberg, The 
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private, was highly contingent on the development of industrial capitalism.16 The notion of a 
separate non-coercive sphere of the ‘economic’ was a modern invention. To generalise, the 
system of rule that developed in the transition from feudalism to absolutism, while 
centralising power and authority in the state, retained many characteristics of the feudal 
systems. The most important for the account here, is that of proprietary kingship. The 
absolutist states of early modern Europe were more akin to estates that were the private 
property of the king. As Symcox describes it, ‘European rulers of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries still regarded their states as personal property—almost as estates—and 
this proprietary view of the state affected their perceptions of its interests.’17 As such, there 
was no clear distinction between commerce and politics, and the idea that there were separate 
processes of ‘market allocation’ and ‘authoritative allocation’ is a severe anachronism. While 
there were certainly self-interested parties who sold services to governments, this cannot be 
seen in the same way as contemporary markets due to the fusion of political and economic 
power in absolutism.   
The fusion of commerce and politics, embodied in the concept of ‘political 
accumulation’,18 has important consequences for international relations, and particularly the 
mobilisation of violence. As Teschke points out, ‘proprietary kingship meant that public 
policy and, a fortiori, foreign policy were not conducted in the name of raison d’Etat or the 
national interest, but in the name of dynastic interests.’19 As such, the mobilisation of 
                                                                                                                                                  
Empire of Civil Society (London: Verso, 1994); c.f. Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence 
(Berkeley: University of Califorina Press, 1987). 
16 The account given here sees capitalism as the development of a particular mode of social relations, in line 
with most historical materialist/Marxist accounts. However, there is no necessary assumption that ‘mode of 
production’ provides the key logic to social and political change. Though there is insufficient space to detail all 
of the various debates about the state-building process and its relationship to capitalism (or industrialism) and 
violence, the position taken here is more in line with Giddens’ quasi-Marxist explanation of the development of 
absolutist states into national-states; Giddens, Nation-State. C.f. Tilly, Coercion; Michael Mann, ‘The Sources 
of Social Power Revisited’, in An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann, eds. John A. Hall 
and Ralph Schroeder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Teschke, ‘Theorizing the Westphalian 
System’; Rosenberg, Empire of Civil Society; and Robert Brenner, ‘From Theory to History: ‘The European 
Dynamic’ or Feudalism to Capitalism?’, in An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann, eds. 
John A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
17 Geoffrey Symcox, ‘Introduction’, in War, Diplomacy, and Imperialism: 1618–1763, ed. Geoffrey 
Symcox (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 2. C.f. Brenner, ‘From Theory to History’; and Teschke, 
‘Theorizing the Westphalian System’. 
18 Brenner, ‘From Theory to History’; Teschke, ‘Theorizing the Westphalian System’. 
19 Teschke, ‘Theorizing the Westphalian System’, 13. 
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violence in international relations was mainly done to settle issues of dynastic inheritance, 
and to protect monopolistic trade routes. The latter was not only reflection of the mercantilist 
political economy that existed internationally, but was also part of the fusion of economic and 
political power domestically, as privileged merchants were granted access to monopoly 
trading charters.20 The regulation of all overseas trade in England by chartered companies is 
one example of such fusion, as was the supporting of such privileges through diplomacy, and 
eventually the 1651 Navigation Acts.21 Without recognition of the broader political economic 
context that was mercantilism, the whole idea of what a ‘market’ itself is (as well as ‘public’ 
and ‘private’), is highly contestable.  
Overall the main problem with Thomson’s account is the conflation of non-state and 
private: privateers and pirates are symptomatic of a system, and while certainly different, the 
difference between market allocation and authoritative allocation is misguided, because 
privateers in the early modern period should be considered both. All in all, these analytic 
categories provide a rather static view of the past, projected too much from present concerns. 
For example, Perotin-Dumon makes a similar claim about the ‘older’ historiography of 
piracy: ‘the meaning of piracy at the beginning of the modern era came to be implicitly 
assessed against these notions of an all-powerful state, of a public sector quite distinct from 
the private sector, and of a navy serving the glory of the nation by suppressing pirates.’22 That 
such categories tend to be used by many contemporary scholars shows that such attitudes 
towards the history of private violence are deeply ingrained, and ends up providing a real 
misreading of the period. The conventional narrative of the period is that of seeing private 
violence only in the context of states developing a monopoly of violence. What it especially 
leaves out is a political economy of violence, important on two different levels: first, in terms 
of understanding the broader economic forces shaping the role of violence within 
                                                
20 Teschke, ‘Theorizing the Westphalian System’, 8. The English East India Company provides an 
exemplary example of this fusion of interest. See the accounts in N. Robins, The Corporation that Changed the 
World: How the East India Company Shaped the Modern Multinational (London: Pluto, 2006) and Phillip 
Lawson, The East India Company: A History (London: Longman, 1993). 
21 For a good account, see M.N. Pearson, ‘Merchants and States’ in The Political Economy of Merchant 
Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350-1750, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 41-116. 
22 Anne Perotin-Dumon, ‘The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and the Law on the Seas, 1450-1850’, in 
Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, ed. C.R. Pennell (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 29. 
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international relations (understanding the nature of political economy in mercantilism); and 
second, for understanding the impact on seaborne violence and naval strategy implied by 
these notions of violence, protection and plunder. 
Mercantilism, Violence and the Atlantic Economy 
Thomson’s main argument in her book is that private violence was de-legitimated through the 
specific actions of state rulers, which fundamentally altered sovereignty as an institution: ‘the 
transformation entailed the state’s monopolisation of the authority to deploy violence beyond 
its borders and the state’s acceptance of responsibility of violence emanating from its 
territory.’23 This was largely due to the unintended consequences of private violence, which, 
though originally utilised to enhance the power of states and further the process of state-
building, began to have deleterious effects in terms of challenging the sovereignty of states 
themselves. While Thomson’s account is partial – too focused on the norms of sovereignty, 
less on changing nature of political power or the advent of modernity and capitalism24 – it is 
mainly focused on the process of de-legitimation. As such, the broader contours that shaped 
private violence are not the main focus of the book. In this light, the broader economic 
aspects of private violence are overlooked: both the nature of the mercantilist economy, and 
the economic role of predation within it. 
Thomson explicitly leaves the global economy out as a research question, stating that 
‘there is a third question, to which the book speaks, at best, only indirectly: what is the 
relationship between the organization of violence and the development of a global capitalist 
economy?’25 This is not to say that Thomson does not discuss these factors: they form a 
crucial part of the background she sets. They just do not, as she notes, play a causal role in 
her study, nor are they dealt with systematically. However, the actual composition of the 
global economy at the time is crucial for understanding the need for piracy and privateering: 
                                                
23 Thomson, Mercenaries, 4. 
24 And only a final note on the second revolution of the eighteenth century: the democratic revolutions in 
France and the United States, and the advent of citizenship rights. 
25 Thomson, Mercenaries, 199, fn 13.  
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the mercantilist version of political economy with its related features of exclusivity and 
plunder, as opposed to the pursuit of free trade and commerce.26  
Focusing on the role of private violence in such an economy can give a basic outline of 
the importance of a political economy perspective. For a start, the impacts of seaborne 
violence can be seen in economic terms, not only in the immediate losses of valuable goods 
and vessels, but also in the broader impact private violence may have on the reduction in 
trade.27 However, what is of greater interest here is the relationship between private violence 
and the global economy more generally. For example, a number of historians have looked at 
piracy in terms of how it was ‘intrinsic’ to an economic system, which is crucially important 
for discussing piracy in the Atlantic in its ‘golden age’ (from about 1650 to 1730). In the 
most basic manner, it involves the degree to which piracy is ‘part of the fiscal or even 
commercial fabric of the society concerned.’28 Here the economic mingles more clearly with 
what could be called cultural (or perhaps ideational) factors, which show broader ideologies 
at work. Anderson sees this mainly in economic terms, but it easily extends to being part of a 
broader cultural ‘way of life’. As such, we can see the intrinsic manifestation as relating to 
the embedding of predation within a society, be it mercantilist versions of economic power, 
or just the particular type of polity.  
The importance of predation to the mercantilist global political economy should therefore 
not be understated. In basic terms, ‘the term mercantilist reflects the symbiotic alliance 
between the state and the commercial interests in pursuit of power and wealth at the expense 
of other states.’29 As such, the mercantilist conception of economic power interlinked war 
and commerce in a manner anathema to the liberal global economy of today. In such a 
                                                
26 Accounts of the Atlantic with political economy at the core can be found in: Ralph Davis, The Rise of the 
Atlantic Economies (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973); Perotin-Dumon, ‘The Pirate and the Emperor’; 
David J. Starkey, ‘Pirates and Markets’, in Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, ed. C.R. Pennell (New York: New 
York University Press, 2001); Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
27 John L. Anderson, ‘Piracy and World Markets: A Economic Perspective on Maritime Predation’, in 
Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, ed. C.R. Pennell (New York: New York University Press, 2001). 
28 Anderson, ‘Piracy and World Markets’, 86. 
29 Anderson, ‘Piracy and World Markets’, 91. C.f. Jacob Viner, ‘Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of 
Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, World Politics Vol. 1, No. 1 (1948): 1-29; and 
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European 
World Economy (New York: Academic Press, 1980). 
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system, predation during wartime was an established way of ensuring that one’s enemies no 
longer gained from trade. In fact, it had become intrinsic to war; as Harding puts it, for 
England ‘what emerged was a view that war should be fought in a way which did not 
necessarily defeat the enemy but which clearly enriched England. The enrichment came from 
the seizure of the enemy’s share of world trade.’30 To the extent to which war and commerce 
were interlinked, plunder was a means to power in an economic system predicated on an 
overall idea of relative gains. The link to piracy and privateering here is obvious, as the two 
activities merely formed a continuum of predatory activity which was part and parcel of 
imperial rivalry, and where, the pursuit of long-distance trade itself was seen as a ‘mild form 
of war.’31  
Seapower was crucial for the development of the Atlantic economy, and European 
mercantilist empires more generally. Mahan’s articulation of the key elements of seapower in 
‘commerce, colonies and shipping’ drives this home well.32 The technological development 
of trans-oceanic ships allowed for the discovery of new lands, the expansion of trade over the 
seas, and also necessitated the protection of such routes. Mahan’s focus on trade reflects the 
major preoccupation of the mercantilist economies, with an emphasis on the control of 
circulation over production. Rosenberg has noted that in pre-capitalist trade, surplus 
accumulation was accrued through control of circulation, and not through production. As he 
describes it, ‘whereas much modern capitalist trade connects centres of production 
competitively, increasing the pressure for surplus extraction in the labour process, 
precapitalist trade connects a centre of production with a distant market and reaps windfall 
profits by setting prices monopolistically.’33 The focus on monopoly trade was a particularly 
important feature of the mercantilist system, especially when considering why a war on the 
trade of other countries became a crucial part of the economic system, but also in maritime 
strategy. 
                                                
30 Richard Harding, Seapower and Naval Warfare 1650-1830 (London: UCL Press, 1999), 142. 
31 J.H. Parry, quoted in Marcus Rediker, Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), 21. 
32 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, Rev. ed. (London: Penguin, 2004), 8; c.f. 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783 (London: Sampson, Low, Marston 
1890). 
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As such, the focus in the development of long-distance seaborne trade was much focused 
on protection of states’ merchant ships (and conversely on the destruction and capture of 
other states’ merchant ships). Prior to the development of centralised and effective national 
navies, much of the cost of protection was borne by merchants themselves, either by arming 
merchant vessels or by paying others to provide protection (which could be done in a variety 
of ways: through insurance, through payments to the Barbary states, etc.). As Lane notes, 
‘operating with lower payments for protection was often the decisive factor in the 
competition between merchants of different cities or kingdoms and was achieved by 
complicated mixtures of public and private enterprise.’34 Developing forms of protection 
were therefore crucial to the mercantilist phase.  
Further to this, the complicated mixture of ‘public’ and ‘private’ noted by Lane above 
also meant a complicated relationship between politics (and emerging states) and merchant 
classes, especially in western Europe.35 As Glete notes, ‘in the early modern maritime world 
protection and violence depended on both private entrepreneurship and political willingness 
to mould foreign policy and naval strategy to the interest of capital engaged in trade.’36 As 
stated earlier, the fusion of commerce and politics complemented this relationship, and it was 
difficult to differentiate between public and private interest. The English Navigation Acts 
provide one example of this fusion, in that they provided a legal basis for English (and later 
British) monopoly on trading to all English colonies. As Harding notes, the Navigation Acts 
‘formed the legal and diplomatic basis of a sustained policy of vigorous government support 
of maritime commerce.’37 Maritime merchant interests were integrated with the political 
elites, so overall, their demands were of government concern.38 
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Pirates were an obvious problem for merchants, who required protection to ensure their 
goods could be shipped (they were also prey to other states’ vessels). As such, prior to the 
development of strong navies, merchant ships developed their own protection, or paid others 
to provide it. As there was no sovereignty over the seas, and most states were not willing or 
able to claim a monopoly of violence over the sea, such violence was not non-state, but 
simply private. Thomson makes an error in claiming that organisations began to question the 
sovereignty of the state: these organisations were part of the power of the state itself. It was 
more that their usefulness declined, especially for Britain’s rising Atlantic hegemony. This 
was particularly apparent with piracy, broadly construed. Until the early eighteenth century, 
Atlantic piracy was tolerated to the extent that it impacted on enemies’ trade (especially 
Spain and France), but as piracy became more and more detrimental to inter-imperial trade, 
and to Britain’s own trade in the Americas, it became less tolerable.39  
The developing Atlantic economy also created a mobile labour force which was 
intimately related to seaborne violence. Navies, merchantmen and privateering vessels all 
drew from the same labour pool, as mariners required particular skills that were transferable 
to all of these vessels. As Rediker notes, ‘by 1700 seafaring labor had been fully 
standardised. Sailors circulated from ship to ship, even from merchant vessels to the Royal 
Navy, into privateering or piracy and then back again, and found the tasks performed and 
skills required by each were essentially the same.’40 The relationship with violence was 
developed quite early, as the development of state run navies drew on an already extant 
community of seafarers, as this community of specialists was already well-versed in violence, 
as having the ability to protect merchant vessels was part of every seaman’s job.41 Different 
states drew on this labour force in different ways, but its existence was a crucial part of the 
development of seapower, in all its forms.42  
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The development of ‘private’ forms of violence can be seen in this context. Both piracy 
and privateering developed from particular needs dictated by the broader political-economic 
context. For example, the main motive for privateering was due to lack of opportunity, not so 
much for lure of prizes. For example, during wartime, normal pursuits such as fishing the 
Grand Banks and trade became too dangerous, and privateering became an alternative.43 The 
lack of opportunity also provided incentives for piracy. In times of large labour surpluses 
piracy was likely to have a burst of activity. The disruption of trade, often caused by war, led 
to economic cycling of piracy, as deep-sea labourers went out of the legitimate work force, 
and needed to find other occupations.44 After 1713, most pirates had been previously working 
on merchant vessels; and piracy is explained more by the decrease in wages for seamen after 
the war, an eventual slump in the maritime economy, and an increase in labour discipline.45   
When the link between mercantilism and private violence is made, it becomes clear why 
‘private’ protection was so important: it enabled merchants to create monopolies over 
particular trading routes; it increased profits through protection rents; and the fusion of public 
and private (and political and economic) meant that protection was a necessary part of 
commerce, and not something the state provided.46 Out of this context of mercantilism and 
the complex mixture of public and private come the early modern pirate and privateer. Piracy 
and privateering were tolerated to the extent to which they benefited the major players in 
inter-imperial rivalry. Privately armed merchant vessels formed a necessary part of protection 
while states were unable to provide protection for their merchants, and ships granted letters of 
marque for raiding opportunities and privately commissioned ‘men-of-war’ were both crucial 
for state that could not afford (or manage) large standing navies that could be utilised in 
wartime.47 Pirates in many ways were just a further extension of this form of private violence, 
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which were often seen as beneficial to the extent to which they attacked enemy shipping. As 
Anderson points out, ‘throughout history, many officials at all levels of authority have found 
it expedient and usually profitable to ignore or even covertly sponsor acts of piracy.’48  
The dominance of mercantilist policies is the key for understanding private seaborne 
violence in early modern Europe. While states still saw pirates, on the one hand, as a way of 
disrupting their enemies’ trade, and privateers, on the other, as a legitimate extension of 
military and economic power, it was impossible to stop piracy, or de-legitimate seaborne 
private violence more generally. As Perotin-Dumon remarks, ‘Western European state-
building and commercial expansion were parallel developments that fed upon each other; 
hence the influence of politics in defining piracy at the time and, conversely, the role of 
piracy in the nation-building process.’49 All of which feeds nicely into the broader political 
economy of piracy: that predation, commerce and state-building all went hand-in-hand.  
Seapower and Maritime Violence 1650-1750 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, seaborne violence went through a number of 
crucial changes. A number of earlier technological changes – such as the development in 
Northern and Atlantic European states of more manoeuvrable and faster sailing vessels to 
replace the Mediterranean galley ships, and especially the mounting of guns on ships – led to 
gradual shifts in strategy.50 Glete notes that improvements in gun and sailing technology 
meant that capital began to replace manpower as key for seapower, as well as expanding the 
range of maritime violence.51 The seventeenth century therefore became a time that was full 
of change in strategic thinking, where battleships became part of more integrated systems of 
strategic planning. While battleships had always been an important symbol of state power, 
the series of wars between the English, Dutch and French in the second half of the 
seventeenth century began to show the importance of battlefleets in interdicting convoys and 
confronting enemy battlefleets. The coordination of battlefleets in line with land warfare was 
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also increasingly important, and the ‘line of battle’ became an important part of concentrating 
power in battle.52 
However, equally important was a broader organisational shift, that saw an increasing 
centralisation and bureaucratisation of naval power, that began to harden distinctions in the 
more generalised violence at sea, firming up much more precisely the difference between 
pirates and privateers, and consequently, the public and private as well.53 As Glete argues, the 
switch from medieval to early modern period in terms of warfare saw a decline of private 
organisations that conducted war to centrally organised institutions, that were separate from 
society, and it was only then that centralised navies began to develop.54 Furthermore, the 
interests of states and merchants also tended to coincide, so navies became a means of 
protecting mercantile activity. This increasing centralisation had lasting impacts on state-
formation, and the development of naval strategy more generally.55  
The changes can be seen conceptually in the increasingly formalised differentiation 
between piracy and privateering. As noted above, these activities previously were much more 
blurred in practice, though formal differentiation existed through the official granting of 
letters of marque and reprisal. It is quite clear that both pirates and privateers engaged in very 
similar forms of violence, often aimed at disrupting shipping and capturing prizes. As 
Rediker further argues, ‘A portion of pirate terror was the standard issue of warmaking, 
which pirates undertook without the approval of the nation-state.’56 
The famous privateers of the Elizabethan era, such as Walter Raleigh and Francis Drake 
provide an early example.57 Privately motivated, but in the ostensible service of the English 
Crown, these privateers severely blurred the line between both state interest and private 
wealth accumulation, but also between privateering and piratical activity. Ritchie notes that 
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they are better described as ‘officially sanctioned pirates’, probably a better indicator of their 
actual activities.58 As Baugh notes ‘their activities were commercial only to the extent that 
organized crime is commercial – sometimes legitimized by active war between England and 
Spain, sometimes not. In either case the mode was based on the use of force and aimed at 
aggrandizing.’59 Overall, these actors were often an embarrassment to the Crown who 
continually needed to make excuses to pardon their behaviour, and the Crown was even less 
able to utilise them in a controlled manner.60  
However, as naval strategy in wartime became increasingly centralised and controlled, 
the differentiation between these activities became more and more formalised. By the end of 
the seventeenth century, the differentiation between privateering and piracy became ever 
clearer. Piracy became ever less tolerated, in terms of its challenge to the existing order and 
its disruption of Atlantic trade; e.g. the English developed tighter and more effective laws 
against piracy in 1698.61 In addition, privateering was ever more tightly defined and regulated 
by the state, in terms of the development of institutions such as prize courts62 and during 
wartime, privateers were much more heavily integrated into naval strategy. As such, the 
Elizabethan Sea Dogs should be really seen as part of a different world – even the knighthood 
of Henry Morgan seems something less and less plausible by the end of the seventeenth 
century.63  
The further codification of privateering and private seaborne violence can be seen clearly 
in the development of French and English naval strategies in the late-seventeenth and early-
eighteenth century. The period from 1689-1713 is striking for a number of issues, not only 
because the two wars – the Nine Years’ War and the War of the Spanish Succession – 
between the English and French (and their allies) fought in this period began to show the 
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developments and codifications of different naval strategies, but also the ways in which these 
two leading states diverged in terms of their relationship to private force. 
The French approach to naval strategy was much more focused on the ‘guerre de course’, 
that is, on the enemies’ (i.e. English/British) merchant fleet.64 While the English were 
certainly still reliant on privateers, these actors were much more a part of a grand naval 
strategy, focused on battlefleet. Both of these strategies were partially of expedience. The 
French in both wars could ill-afford to maintain a large battlefleet, and because of the strong 
relationship between English overseas trade and naval power, the focus on the guerre de 
course was not as hopeless as some Anglo-centric strategists have suggested.65 The English 
on the other hand had focused both on the development of a centralised navy, which 
coincided with a focus on the battlefleet. However, the focus on the battlefleet was not due to 
its perceived superiority: it simply fit the needs of an island nation dependent on trade, and 
reluctant to put its military resources in large standing armies.66 The battlefleet provided a 
way to deal with both issues, by disrupting the war on English trade, and by providing a 
means for the English to provide a decisive impact on seapower, which could support its 
allies on the continent. The English had also focused on the battlefleet as the war on French 
shipping was much less successful, due to French reliance on internal trade and the taille.67  
While this distinction between strategies is important, it goes too far in saying that each 
power chose one over the other. First, the combination of privateering and battlefleets is of 
great interest, as both the French and English used both. The French, in both wars, eventually 
gave up the battlefleet almost entirely to focus on English trade. The English felt this impact, 
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but by the War of the Spanish Succession, had increased their trading power substantially. 
What we do see though is the development of two different organisational strategies in terms 
of ‘private’ violence.  
For the English, both wars proved politically difficult in terms of the lack of decisive 
naval advantage that could be pressed in winning the war, and with the attacks on merchant 
shipping.68 Harding notes that the former problem was mainly dealt with by attacking enemy 
shipping in ways that would enrich England. As such, English/British naval power in wartime 
was still directed at destroying both enemy trade and battlefleets. The latter was solved by an 
increasing attention to the protection of convoys (legislated in the 1707 Cruizers and 
Convoys Act).69 This began the major issue in the development of a state monopoly on 
violence: the distinction between public and private protection, with the protection of trade 
becoming more important than predation.  
The French, ironically, with an increasingly centralised state, relied on a combination of 
public and private naval power, which was mainly focused on predation. While the French 
did have one of the biggest battlefleets in Europe, the ineffectiveness of their naval campaign 
in the early 1690s led to a change of course, towards the guerre de course.70 The strategy, 
based on Vauban’s memo of 1695, was based on the logic that the English and Dutch war 
effort was mainly predicated on their success in overseas trade, and that destroying that trade 
would have a huge impact on their abilities to prosecute the war further. The French 
privateers used a mix of public and private enterprise, using loaned-out royal ships as well as 
private enterprise in the war on English shipping.71 While the campaign was successful in 
terms of the amount vessels captured, the French were less successful in disrupting trade 
overall, as huge increases in overseas trade meant that the English were able to absorb much 
of the losses.72 
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Overall, the period of 1650-1750 saw not the straightforward de-legitimisation of private 
violence through the development of state monopolies (for example through the development 
of centralised navies), but the integration of privateers and battleships in different styles of 
emergent naval strategies. While there is no doubt that state-building was a hugely important 
part of the process, the interaction between strategic violence at sea, and the emerging 
private-public divide is more complicated than a straightforward ‘de-legitimisation’. Indeed, 
despite the increasing effectiveness of the Royal Navy in the eighteenth century, privateering 
flourished until the nineteenth century.73 Furthermore, the British and French states had 
decidedly different approaches to privateering. For the French, privateering was mainly 
sponsored by the state as part of its military strategy, while in Britain it was mainly a business 
activity that the state facilitated.74 These different approaches only further highlight the very 
different activities in the sphere of ‘private violence’ in the period. 
The key relationship between privateering and piracy as forms of private violence in the 
eighteenth century was that they formed part of a continuum of economic plunder that states 
desired and relied upon as part of their economic well-being. When piracy lost the function of 
being for a particular state, its usefulness diminished, but it was really only a part of the 
broader picture of plunder that formed the core ideology of the British Atlantic world: a 
continuum of war and commerce. The Peace of Utrecht was a turning point in Atlantic 
violence, where the increasing power of the Royal Navy, the increasing radicalisation of 
pirates, and their increasingly negative impact on the Atlantic economy led to their 
destruction. It was not as if piracy was not illegal before, it was just ignored inasmuch as it 
could not be effectively eliminated, and to the end it was more a nuisance (and sometimes a 
boon, if pirates attacked rivals) than anything terribly serious. In a sense, the British gains in 
the War of the Spanish Succession were about increasing protection rents, which the 
consolidation of naval power helped with. As Perotin-Dumon states, ‘merchants laid down 
their weapons and accepted that the state would protect their business in exchange for 
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regulating and taxing it. There would have been no “suppression of piracy” without this 
change in relationship between merchant and state.’75 
Conclusion: Private Violence Then and Now 
In early modern Europe, private violence was tolerated mainly because of its usefulness in 
the war against enemy trade. In an Atlantic system that was still governed by the strong 
relationship between wealth and power, the fusing of public and private interests was still 
strong. However, in the British example, this relationship was starting to wane somewhat, as 
the combination of state-provided protection and the overall gains of trade as opposed to 
predation were becoming ever more clear, the restrictive trading practices defined by the 
Navigation Acts began to dissipate.76 The gradual decline of private violence was due to a 
combination of factors: the development of effective protection of merchants, the increasing 
importance of trade over predation, and the changing nature of naval warfare.  
The role of private seaborne violence historically gives some very interesting parallels to 
present phenomena. The relationship between the sea and economic enterprise, the highly 
skilled nature of the maritime community, and the relationship between violence and 
protection were all crucial in the development of states. The reason the historical comparison 
is useful is that the situation of contemporary PMCs seems much more resonant with 
privateering than with other types of mercenary activity. This is due to some of the 
similarities of service between professional armed forces, the professional nature of the 
activity, and due to the profit-oriented nature of violent enterprise. However, the key 
difference between private violence in the early modern era and the present is that categories 
of private and public were being established, and it was not just a case of the state tightening 
control, but the development of particular social system that required these kinds of 
arrangements. In the current context, it is a question of advanced capitalism requiring ever 
more differentiation between public and private, and possibly a declining statism. In many 
ways, an adequate account of private violence in the present needs to re-examine the role of 
the state in the present international political economy, and in particular focus on the 
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connections between the state, globalisation and violence. The theorising of a broader context 
for private violence is crucial to better understand the current dynamics at work in the 
international system, and potential changes that the increase in private violence holds for the 
relationship between the state and violence. 
 
